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The Effects of China's One-
Child Policy: The Significance 
for Chinese Women 
Kristine Sudbeck 
Abstract: In 1979. China introduced the legislation of the One-Child 
Policy to be implemented as a temporary means of curbing such high 
population growth. Over thirty years have passed since its 
implementation. and this family planning policy still continues to be 
controversial. Much of academia has focused on the problems 
stemmingfrom this policy. such as increased abortions. the 
underreporting of live births. infants abandoned and/or left at 
orphanages. female infanticide and an imbalanced ratio of males to 
females among the Chinese population. Not much scholarship has 
focused on the benefits of China 's One-Child Policy. especially for 
women. Since this policy 's implementation. China has experienced 
changes in filial piety and patrilineality. In a land where sons have 
been highly cherishedfor thousands of years. singleton daughters are 
now experiencing greater parental investment and consequently 
greater gender equality within their society. In a country that has been 
traditionally dominated by males. China's One-Child Policy has 
indirectly benefited the role of women in society. 
Introduction 
For thousands of years, sons have been highly revered in 
Chinese culture. Sons were expected to carry on the honor of the family 
name, wealth, and the expectation to provide for his parents. Males 
dominated all aspects of Chinese life. In 1979, China introduced one of 
the world's most extreme state mandated policies for population 
control, one in which all married couples were to be restricted to having 
only one child. Even immediately after its implementation, the Chinese 
continued to believe in this cultural value in males. 
Now, after thirty-two years of the One-Child Policy, those 
who were born as an only child under the policy are becoming parents 
themselves. As to be expected, some of these individuals were 
daughters. Without having to compete with brothers, much more 
43 
parental investment has been focused on these daughters in terms of 
education, pride, and wealth. 'fhese daughters, who were the only child 
in their family, have increasingly become active members of Chinese 
society. Higher education levels have provided a means for women to 
work in non-traditional jobs outside of the home. Women's earnings 
can then be focused not only on their own offspring, but for their own 
parents as well. 
While China's One-Child Policy was first implemented to 
curb such high population growth within the country, I purport that it 
has inadvertently transformed the social structure within this society to 
allow for Chinese women to experience greater gender equality. 
Context in China 
Male Preference 
Traditionally, Chinese culture has placed high value on males 
within the society. Confucian influence and the dominance of an 
agricultural economy are both significant factors in the historical 
promotion of the Chinese preference for large families, especially those 
with many sons (Li and Cooney 1993:277-8). These sons are not only 
viewed as the laborers of the family, they support the older generation. 
They are perceived as the ones who continue the family line, tend the 
ancestral shrine, and carry the honor of his family name. Couples feel 
obligated to bear a son to be the heir of the family. In China and Hong 
Kong during the 1950s and 1960s, there was a common name among 
girls called die di, which translates "bring a younger brother" (Chan et 
al. 2002:427). This expresses the commonality of the desire for sons 
within the culture. Customarily, Chinese couples ensured having a son 
by producing more children or marrying another wife. Infertile couples 
tended to adopt a nephew with permission from a kinsman (Chan et al. 
2002:427). Infertility or not having a son is viewed as a "curse in life" 
by the Chinese (Chan et al. 2002:427). 
For many years, Chinese couples have preferred sons over 
daughters because males carry on the family name. This continuation of 
the family tree is perceived to be a filial obligation. Family genograms 
which can be found in the traditional ancestral halls most commonly 
contain a list of all names of sons and grandsons (Chan et al. 
2002:427). The names offefnale offspring are typically left out, as they 
will later change their surname after becoming married. It is believed 
that after these women are married, they belong to her husband and his 
family . Parents rely heavily on their sons and daughters-in-law for old 
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age security and carrying out funeral rituals when they die; hence, 
families tend to invest more in their male offspring. 
In addition, male preference is especially prominent among 
those living in rural areas. This is because sons are valued to help in 
farming and hard manual labor in order to support their family. 
Approximately 70 percent of the population still lives in the rural areas 
of China (Chan et al. 2002:427), which enhances this traditional male 
preference even more. 
The patriarchal system in China is also very dominant. Men 
are among those who usually make all the major decisions in the 
family. Gender roles were also very adamant within China, as men are 
usually still the main source of financial income for the family and 
women do not generally work outside the home. Chan et al. (2002) 
notes that women are more likely to be in more casual and lower 
paying jobs, with less opportunity for promotion, and more likely to be 
laid off. Females also do not receive comparable benefits, such as 
medical insurance, like their male counterparts. 
Population Control 
China's issue of gender preference was complicated even 
more by the introduction of the One-Child Policy that was implemented 
to control population growth in 1979. Over one-fifth of the world 
population resides within China (Lai 2005:315). This unprecedented 
population growth may in part be due to the Chinese Communist 
Revolution in 1949, which provided better health care, decreasing 
infant mortality and increasing life expectancy (Deutsch 2006:366-7). 
China's population at the tum of the century was just over 1.2 billion 
people, and is expected to peak at 1.6 billion by the year 2050 even 
after the policy's implementation (Chan et al. 2002:428). 
Given this expectation for high population growth even after 
the policy was implemented, the Chinese government began to meet in 
the mid-1970s to deter the deleterious effects of high population in a 
country who was experiencing great economic hardship and a 
collapsing environment. After the death of Mao and the rise of Deng 
Xiaoping in the late 1970s, population studies and the planned control 
of this growth became a crucial component of China's socialist 
modernization (Greenhalgh 2003:167). By using concepts and ideas 
with the planned economy, population scientists argued that the 
population problem was incompatible with the economic and 
demographic development within China (Greenhalgh 2003: 167). 
Population became recognized as a national crisis; therefore, they relied 
on drastic measures to counterbalance the well-being of the Chinese 
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people with economic, environmental and global ascent. From these 
meetings, the government began employing different family planning 
programs, one in which was the One-Child Policy itself. These strict 
birth control procedures were implemented first in cities and areas of 
high population density, and later all throughout China, especially for 
those of the Han ethnic group who accounted for over 90 percent of the 
total population (Lai 2005). 
The Policy and Its Regulations 
After understanding the context of the Chinese government 
that was in place at the conception of the One-Child Policy, we can 
now look at the policy and its regulations further in depth. Population 
scientists provided the government with a policy to ensure drastic 
changes within family planning. After the signing of China's One-
Child Policy in 1979, all married urban couples were allowed to only 
have one child. This creates a typical family of four grandparents and 
two parents to one singleton child (also referred to as an only child). 
This singleton child would therefore not be replacing the prior 
generations, dramatically reducing the expected population growth 
within the country. Enforcement of this policy is held at the provincial 
level. For any additional child, the couple must pay a fme based upon 
the province of residence, family income, etc. 
In lieu of risking the chance of paying this large fee, couples 
are encouraged to sign the One-Child Certificate. After pledging that 
they will only have one child, the couple then becomes eligible for 
certain benefits provided by the government, such as an allowance for 
the child until he/she reaches the age of 14, longer maternity leaves, 
priority access for hospitals and schools, and pensions for parents when 
they reach old age (Zhang and sturm 1994:69). Couples who sign the 
certificate, but then violate the policy not only lose these benefits, but 
are also subject to penalties from the government. According to the 
policy, these couples in violation were to be even more seriously 
punished than those without the certificate at all. One sanction included 
the return of all benefits the family had received upon signing the 
certificate. In addition, the couple received an administrative sanction 
from the government, which included a cut in the couple's salary or 
demotion within a company, a denial of household registration status 
for the baby, denial of graintrations, and the refusal of maternal leave 
(Banister 1987; Cooney et al. 1991; Park and Han 1988; Tien 1991). 
Though the ramifications stemming from this policy may 
seem harsh for Chinese citizens, there are some exceptions to the One-
Child Policy. While urban couples were permitted to have only one 
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child, rural couples were allowed to have a second child under the 
condition that their first child was a girl and they wait at least 3-4 years 
(Liu et al. 2004:32). Ethnic minorities were also treated differently 
under this policy, as they were allowed to have more than one child. 
Ethnic groups with less than 10 million people (which included all 54 
groups except the Zhuang ethnic group) were allowed to have two 
children (Zhang 1998). 
In addition to rural families and ethnic minorities, there were 
also certain situations that remained exempt from this policy. If a 
couple was to birth multiple children within one pregnancy, it would 
still be perceived to follow the one-child (one-birth) rule. Additionally, 
if the couple was to lose their only child to an early death, the couple is 
allowed to have another child. The policy was more recently eased in 
1984 when conditions were relaxed to allow couples made up of two 
singleton children (both only children themselves) to have a second 
child (Liu et al. 2004: 23). 
Adaptations stemming from this policy 
After the policy's implementation in 1979, many changes 
accrued within Chinese society to cope with this significant change in 
family planning. While some of these practices already existed and 
increased in frequency, other practices were brought about in direct 
response to this family planning policy. The challenges that Chinese 
families faced brought about practices of sex-selective abortion, 
infanticide, abandonment of children, undocumented children, 
sterilization, an increase in fertility drugs, movement away from 
Mainland China, and an unequal gender ratio. 
First, sex-selective abortion became more prominent within 
Chinese society during the 1980s when technological advancements 
came to the medical field by enhancing the ultrasound equipment 
(Miller 2001: 1089). Keeping in mind that Chinese families traditionally 
desired sons and given the new strict family planning programs of only 
being allowed one child, many of these were female-selective 
abortions. To counteract these female-selective abortions, the Chinese 
government banned hospitals from using ultrasound equipment and 
revealing the sex of the child to its parents starting in 1993 (The 
Christian Science Monitor 1995). Although Chinese laws were in place 
that prohibited health care workers of informing the families about the 
biological sex of the fetus, it appears that there is a lack of enforcement 
and punishment when the information leaked (Lai 2005:324). It is 
perceived that the total number of females aborted from 1980-2000 in 
China is approximately 4 million (Miller 2001: 1086). 
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Abortion is not the only practice to rid families of an 
undesirable child. Infanticide, most commonly that of females, has also 
become a common practice in China in response to the One-Child 
Policy. While Divale and Harris (1976) purport that female-infanticide 
is practiced as part of a system which reduces population growth in 
societies where warfare is present, Dickemann (1979) thinks that 
female-infanticide can be better explained as a cultural practice that 
increases reproductive success. Instead, Hawkes (1981) argues that 
female infanticide is best explained by synthesizing these two theories 
when taking into account: 
1) Relationships among populations and resources 
2) The way this is organized economically and politically, with 
special attention to the contribution having children makes to 
perpetuation of these arrangements 
3) The different constraints this imposes on the behavior of 
women and men 
[Hawkes 1981 :95] 
Within China, the most common practice of a child's death 
during the infancy stage is female infanticide. This can be attributed to 
families who seek a son as their only child. This practice is especially 
prevalent in rural areas, as couples prefer sons to daughters because 
sons can assist in farm labor activities (Chan et al. 2002:427). This can 
also occur in families allowed two children who already have two 
children of the same sex and wish to have one of each. These infants 
are then subjected to poor health care, lack of medical treatment, 
malnourishment, etc. 
Another adaptation stemming from this policy is the 
abandonment of children, which again are most commonly girls. China 
is estimated to have one million orphans, with nearly all of them being 
girls (Chan et al. 2002:429). Many Chinese girls left in orphanages are 
abandoned soon after birth, whereas most boys are abandoned after 
realizing visible disabilities or illness of the child (Chan et al. 
2002:429). Since most girls are abandoned soon after birth, the parents 
do not register the child, as they can still use the childbearing permit to 
try to conceive a boy (Chan et al. 2002:429). The annual number of 
adoptions in China rose from less than 200,000 children adopted during 
the 1970s to about 400,008 during 1984-86, which then progressed to 
over 500,000 in 1987 (Johansson and Nygren 1991). This large 
increase in adoptions can be in part to the greater number of children 
available at orphanages, as well as a method to have another child in 
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the family without getting fined for noncompliance to the One-Child 
Policy. 
As stated earlier, some parents to not register their unwanted 
child and abandon him or her, leaving them as undocumented children. 
Other children may remain completely undocumented by the Chinese 
government and still live with the family. Zeng et al. (1993) reported 
that couples who already had two daughters and wanted a son could 
bypass the rules of sterilization after two children by hiding the second 
child or under-reporting people in the household to the government 
entities. This may occur in provinces where the policy is not as strictly 
enforced; however, this child's life becomes much more complicated 
when dealing with any situations where governmental documentation is 
involved. 
Sterilization is another change in response to the policy, as it 
has become the most prevalent method of contraception within China. 
Approximately half of all women of reproductive age have reported 
that either they or their husbands have been sterilized (Short et al. 
2000:279). Sterilization is strongly promoted by the Chinese 
government. In 1982, the Chinese government advocated sterilization 
as the preferred method for couples with a second birth (Short et al. 
2000:279). 
While some couples have complied with the government's 
family planning policy, others choose to avoid it. Some couples have 
found this population control policy to contradict their own beliefs; 
rather than adapting to the country's mandated policy, they move from 
Mainland China so that the policy does not apply to them anymore. 
Some immigrate to other nations where they are allowed more freedom 
in their reproductive choices. Others move to Chinese territories such 
as Hong Kong or Macau, who have been granted a 50 year grace period 
after the transfer of colonial rule to Chinese rule. While these territories 
will eventually come under Chinese rules and regulations, at this 
moment they have their own government and policies in place. The 
One-Child policy does not apply there; therefore, families are moving 
from Mainland China in order to have more children. 
Another way in which couples are resisting the One-Child 
Policy to have more children is with the rise in fertility drugs. These 
drugs have become widely available and more frequently used in order 
to increase the chances of reproduction for couples with problems 
conceiving, as well as enhancing opportunities for couples to have 
multiple births within one pregnancy. As stated earlier, the birth of 
mUltiples such as twins, triplets, quadruplets, etc. is exempt from the 
One-Child Policy since it occurs from one pregnancy. In 2005, a 
hospital in the eastern city ofNanjing reported a sharp increase in the 
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number of twins and triplets delivered jumping from a yearly average 
of20 sets to 90 sets (BBC News, 2005:1). The medical advancement of 
fertility drugs has allowed couples to have better reproductive success, 
despite the odds against them. 
The final and maybe most controversial adaptation hailing 
from the implementation of this policy is the unequal gender ratio 
(Hesketh and Xing 2006). This unequal gender ratio may be attributed 
to some of the aforementioned adaptations, such as female-selective 
abortion, female infanticide, abandonment and undocumentation of 
females. One way to measure gender ratio within a society is by 
looking at the sex ratio at birth (SRB) which can be defined as "the 
number of live males to females born to a population within a given 
period, usually a year" (Lai 2005:313). In 1981, the sex ratio at birth 
for the majority of provinces in Mainland China were slightly higher 
than 106, which is the number generally regarded as the upper limit of 
a normal SRB (Lai 2005:317). 
After the subsequent census in 2000, it was found that the sex 
ratio at birth increased to an extremely high level for all the provinces 
except one, Xizang which had an SRB of97.43 favoring more females 
than males. The highest SRB in 2000 was 138.01 in the province of 
Jiangxi (Lai 2005:320). Additionally, the provinces of Anhui, Henan 
and Guangdong had each an SRB greater than 130, with several other 
provinces with an SRB close to 130 (Lai 2005:321). As demonstrated 
through this census information, China has experienced a great shift in 
the sex ratio at birth favoring more males than females. In addition, 
female infanticide is also more common, which decreases the amount 
of females within the society even more. There is a huge gap between 
the amount of females and males within China, especially among those 
born after the signing of the One-Child Policy in 1979. 
Changes in Social Structure 
The adaptations that have occurred in China following the 
implementation of the One-Child Policy have also presented Chinese 
society with changes in their social structure. Social structure can be 
defined as "rule-governed relationships-with all their rights and 
obligations-that hold members of a society together. This includes 
households, families, associations, and power relations, including 
politics" (Haviland et al. 2007:155). The aspects of Chinese social 
structure that have transformed in light of the One-Child Policy are: 
marriage, post-marital residence patterns, filial piety, patrilineality, 
gender roles, and parental investment. 
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As discussed earlier, there is an extreme difference in the ratio 
of males to females within Chinese society, which has stemmed from 
male preference practices such as female-selective abortion, female 
infanticide and females placed in orphanages (which can possibly be 
adopted from outside the country). This unequal gender ratio may cause 
many problems for the availability of prospective spouses. 
There may not be one universal definition of marriage that 
applies to all societies; however, no matter who constitutes as the 
spouses in the marriage union, (e.g. male-male, male-female, female-
female, male-intersex, female-intersex, or multiple partners) there 
usually tends to be a public ceremony recognizing this relationship, a 
creation of ties between the two intermarrying families, and specific 
rights and obligations for each spouse. Ember and Ember define 
marriage as a "socially approved sexual and economic union, usually 
between a woman and man" (2007:161). This union is considered to be 
more or less permanent, whereby including reciprocal rights and 
obligations between the two (or more) spouses, and between spouses 
and their future children. 
Historically, Chinese society has accepted monogamy as the 
most common form of marriage; however, some forms of polygyny are 
also present. With the scarcity of females within the population, should 
China expect to see polyandrous marriage practices emerge? Given the 
historical context of Chinese preference of sons and male dominance 
and no current documentation of this practice within China, I believe 
that the practice of polyandry is not very likely to occur. Instead, males 
have been seeking females outside of their age range. In addition, 
Guttentag and Secord (1983) suggest that societies with a relative 
under-supply of women tend to value women more, and are 
consequently less inclined to divorce. 
While the structure of marriage has been transforming after 
the creation of the One-Child Policy, so have post-marital residence 
patterns (Hong 1987). Traditionally, Chinese couples tended to be 
patrilocal, residing with or near the family of the husband. After 1979, 
there are now more singleton children in China, each of which may 
experience a heavy reliance from their parents since they have no other 
siblings. Post-marital residence is one very important aspect of taking 
care of one's parents in their old age in China. 
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In duo local residence, husband and wife do not live together 
but in separate homes, which can be near the homes of their 
own parents. In matri-patrilocal residence, the couple 
alternates their place of residence. In spite of the apparent 
fairness of the above alternatives, the choice in China is more 
likely to be uxorilocal marriage, where the husband resides in 
the wife's household [Hong, 1987: 321]. 
Just as both marriage and post-marital residence patterns have 
transformed since the policy's implementation, another aspect of 
Chinese social structure that has changes is filial piety. In a study 
performed in the early 1990s, the average parent's ideal child possessed 
'good moral character' which meant that the child demonstrated love 
towards others, cooperation in a group setting, good manners, respect 
for elders, obedience, and dongshi which stands for an understanding of 
adults' desires (Wu, 1996). After examining the differences between 
singleton children and children with siblings, Deutsch purports that 
filial piety itself has not vanished with the coming of what was 
perceived to be spoiled 'little emperors,' also known as singleton 
children (Deutsch 2006:369). Instead, she found that only children were 
just as likely as children with siblings to demonstrate as much concern 
for and responsibility towards their parents, and even more emotional 
closeness (Deutsch 2006:385). One important aspect of filial piety is to 
provide for one's parents in their old age. Lai argues that the more 
developed regions of China should provide some form of social 
retirement arrangement, especially for families that have only one 
daughter (2005:324). However, Deutsch notes that filial piety has 
transformed into something relevant for singleton daughters. Daughters 
who had no brothers to support their parents in old age began to 
compensate for the brothers they lacked (2006:369). These daughters 
began supporting their parents financially with the income they made, 
and also are increasingly sharing the same place of residence with their 
parents. 
The patrilineal systems are also another aspect of China's 
social structure that has changed due in part to the One-Child Policy. 
Since singleton children will not have any nephews or nieces, and their 
children will not have any uncles, aunts or first cousins, it will 
consequently only take about 40 years for the newest member in the 
family to find himlherselfwithout any collateral relatives within the 
fifth degree, which are the traditional boundaries for Chinese lineages 
(Hong 1987). This is assuming the couple, their child, and their 
grandchild all marry in their early 20s and have their own offspring 
shortly afterward. Therefore, the patrilineal network will be reduced to 
only the direct lineal kin-patents, grandparents, and great grandparents 
(Hong 1987:319). This decomposition ofpatrilineality is becoming 
increasingly more prevalent as children born under the One-Child 
Policy as an only child are becoming parents themselves. 
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Another alteration found in the Chinese social structure is the 
changing of gender roles within society. As long as women have to 
invest most of their adult lives to childbearing, they are less likely to be 
able to prepare and commit themselves to their gender-specific careers. 
In contrast, if childbearing is reduced to a relatively short time period 
early in their lives or perhaps completely eliminated, Chinese women 
may find it more rewarding to prepare for and obtain careers 
traditionally held by men in their society (Hong 1987). Cross cultural 
studies have examined that a drastic decline in fertility is accompanied 
by a large increase in women's labor force participation (Davis and van 
den Oever 1982). However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
women take over occupations that are heavily dominated by men. 
Since the One-Child Policy reduces the amount of time spent 
on childbearing, early marriage and early pregnancy would allow 
women to be freed from child-rearing responsibilities at a relatively 
young age (Hong 1987:323). Fong noted that among her survey 
respondents, students expected the division of domestic work in their 
own marriages to be more egalitarian than in their parents' marriages 
(2002: 11 05). In addition to shared domestic work, it is now much more 
acceptable for women to work outside the home and earn their own 
income. 
The final aspect of Chinese social structure that is essential to 
examine is parental investment. The differential investment in offspring 
can be further examined by the Trivers-Willard hypothesis which 
predicts that high-status individuals will invest more in sons, and low-
status individuals will invest more in daughters (Trivers 1972; Trivers 
and Willard 1973). This hypothesis was first tested among species 
different than our own, but has since been further supported by Cronk 
(2000) who studied the Mukogodo of Kenya, a low-status group of 
mothers who experiences high female-biased parental investment. 
Furthermore, Irons (2000) has supporting research with his study of the 
Y omut Turkmen of Central Asian Turkestan, who can be viewed as 
high-status mothers with greater investment in sons than daughters. 
Parental investment, as indicated by the Trivers-Willard 
hypothesis not only applies to the sex ratio at birth. It also includes the 
investment in offspring after birth, which may include nurturing of 
children while they are young, in addition to parental investments in the 
education, as well as social and cultural development of their children 
(Hopcroft 2005: 1113). Though classical studies of gender in Chinese 
societies is greatly dominated by the parental investment in males, 
females born after China's One-Child Policy have no brothers to 
compete with, and therefore receive greater parental investment 
themselves. Fong argues that daughters without brothers are more 
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likely to be encouraged to further their education and pursue 
demanding occupations (2002: 1.099). In previous generations, the 
greater studiousness of girls was limited, since their parents were 
reluctant to invest money in their daughter's education. Sometimes they 
even made daughters drop out of school to work and fund their 
brother's education (Fong 2002: 1103). Brotherless daughters are they 
are encouraged to strive academically and have successful careers since 
they are their parents' only objects of investment, and consequently the 
only hope for support in their old age (Fong 2002:1103). 
Significance for Chinese Women 
While much scholarship has been placed on the detrimental 
effects of the One-Child Policy, what benefits have surfaced for the 
Chinese people? Beyond the obvious social and economic advantages 
of retarding the massive population growth, and subsequently 
commensurating it with the economic development and availability of 
resources, such as adequate food and fresh water, the One-Child Policy 
has fueled a significant change for the benefit of Chinese women that 
may ultimately outweigh its adverse effects (Hong 1987:318-9). This 
policy may eliminate the right women have to control their own 
reproduction, which has inadvertently encouraged female-selective 
abortions and female infanticide; however, it also has the potential to 
ironically allow Chinese women to achieve what was once held as an 
unattainable goal of social equality. 
Rosaldo (1974) believes this gender inequality can be 
attributed to a universal opposition between the domestic orientation of 
women and the orientation of predominately men into public spheres. 
The fertility transition accompanied with modernization not only 
enables but compels women to devote themselves to work and 
education rather than only motherhood (Fong 2002). With the adoption 
of a modern economy, China has seen an increase in women's 
employment rates and diminishing parental bias against daughters as 
they begin to earn money. After the One-Child Policy, China has 
dramatically dropped in fertility. The total fertility rate was around 6 
during the 1950s and 1960s, and by the end of the 1990s the total 
fertility rate dropped to 1.22 (NBS 2002). This extreme decrease in 
fertility has consequently produced empowerment among women. 
As stated earlier, sing~ton daughters have no siblings, most 
importantly brothers, to compete with for parental investment. Parents 
of singleton daughters are now encouraging these young women to 
strive academically, study abroad, and have a successful career. It has 
become more widely accepted for women to work outside of the home, 
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especially in urban areas. In 2007 Huang Qinghi, the vice-president of 
the All-China Women's Federation Secretariat stated, "45 percent of 
China's laborers were female, with over 4 million women living in 
rural areas being lifted out of destitution" (Xinhua 2007: I). Not only 
are women to work outside of the home, but they have also become 
active members in politics. In 2007, the proportion of female officials 
at various levels of government and provincial institutions is 40 percent 
(Xinhua 2007:1). Chinese women are still not as likely as males to hold 
higher positions; however, since 2001, five women have been promoted 
to high profile positions (Xinhua 2007:1). Strides have been made 
towards a more egalitarian society among men and women alike. 
Conclusion 
Since the signing of the One-Child Policy in 1979, the 
preference for sons in China has been seriously challenged. While 
some practices may have been used in this sex-selective process 
immediately following its implementation, we are now beginning to see 
those societal norms change. Specifically, the One-Child Policy may 
transform society into a country which the patrilineal system may cease 
to be a significant factor in everyday life (Hong 1987:319). 
Strengths 
One may already witness the strides women have made 
towards gender equality within China, such as educational attainment, 
career choices, and political participation. The patrilineal kinship 
system is disintegrating, just as the filial piety has been transformed 
into something that is compatible with singleton daughters. Marriage 
and post-marital residence patterns have also adapted to the shift in 
popUlation demographics following the One-Child Policy. Parental 
investment has also become something not only reserved for sons, as 
some parents do not have any sons in which they can invest. Daughters 
have seen a transformation occur that has allowed resources to be 
allocated for their own success. Chinese daughters born prior to the 
One-Child Policy were severely hindered by the norms within the 
society. In contrast, singleton daughters today enjoy exceptional 
support for their effort to challenge preconceived norms working 
against them (Fong 2002). Since these daughters are no longer 
systematically excluded from familial and societal resources, females 
have been able to prosper towards a more egalitarian society. 
Limitations 
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While educational attainment, career choice, and political 
participation following the One-Child Policy may very well constitute 
as support for better gender equality in China, it is still unclear what 
impact other factors have played in promoting gender equality. For 
example, globalization may be a subordinate means for this gender 
equality to emerge. Other countries, as well as organizations like the 
United Nations have promoted gender equality throughout the world. 
The developed countries have recognized women with an allocation of 
rights, as well as counteracting discrimination against these women. In 
addition, how significant of a role did the overturn of the government in 
1949 to become the People's Republic of China play in promoting 
gender equality? Feminist movements were introduced during this 
period, in reflection to other feminist movements going on around the 
world in years prior. 
Others may argue that China still has not experienced gender 
equality, and Chinese society still has a very dominant preference for 
males. While this may hold true in some aspects, I believe that this is a 
developmental process and cannot change overnight. By taking small 
steps to ensure women's rights and access to education and other 
resources, we will see more progressive advancements of gender 
equality in the future. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
Previous studies have argued that the significance of Chinese 
cultural norms on childbearing has been weakened by socioeconomic 
development and modernization. It was viewed culturally acceptable to 
bear many children, with the importance being held on sons. However, 
it has been difficult to locate any published studies in English with 
empirical data systematically testing the interaction between son 
preference and socioeconomic development. The Trivers-Willard 
Hypothesis should be tested in this specific country to report and 
adverse effects it has had on the population over time. A longitudinal 
study would be very beneficial in this situation; however, it may be too 
late to document this. I also think a comparative study between rural 
and urban populations would be valuable and necessary. Earlier 
research has focused on the role of governmental control in urban areas 
with a lack of this same cOittrol in rural areas. What effects has this 
played in the social structure and gender equality of both rural and 
urban areas of China? 
In addition, I have not been able to locate any previous studies 
with empirical data studying the role adoption has played, perhaps as a 
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strategy to circumvent the One-Child Policy. It would be interesting to 
see how many couples adopted children that were not their own 
biological children, so that they could reach the desired amount of 
children within their family. 
It is also still unclear what the future holds for such an uneven 
gender ratio. For those born under the One-Child Policy, there is in 
extreme gap in the availability for females to males. What will this 
mean for potential marriage partners, the frequency of same-sex 
marriage, and those who will not marry or produce any child(ren) at 
all? 
In Summary 
Most scholars have focused much of their time studying the 
hardships created by China's One-Child Policy. Those that do express 
benefits typically only speak of the lower population and what 
advantages it has given families and Chinese society as a whole. 
However, little scholarship has focused on hidden unintentional effects 
this policy has had on the promotion of gender equality. This review of 
literature has allowed for a less prominent benefit to surface, one in 
which Chinese society no longer holds such a disparity between males 
and females . While China's One-Child Policy was first implemented to 
curb such high population growth within the country, it has 
inadvertently transformed the social structure to allow for Chinese 
women to progress towards greater gender equality. 
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